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Abstract—As radio spectrum sharing matures, one of the
main challenges becomes finding adequate governance systems
and the appropriate enforcement mechanisms. Historically, these
processes were assigned to a central entity (in most cases a
governmental agency). Nevertheless, the literature of Common
Pool Resources (CPRs) shows that other governance mechanisms
are possible, which include collaboration with a private, third-
party regulator or the complete absence of central institutions,
as in self-enforcement solutions. These alternatives have been
developed around well-known CPRs such as fisheries, forests, etc.
As argued by Weiss et al [50], and other researchers, spectrum
can indeed be considered to be a CPR. In this work we study
the two extremes of governance systems that could be applied
to spectrum sharing scenarios. Initially, we study the classical
centralized scheme of command and control, where governmental
institutions are in charge of rule-definition and enforcement.
Subsequently, we explore a government-less environment, i.e., a
distributed enforcement approach. In this anarchy situation (i.e.,
lack of a formal government intervention as defined by Leeson
[29]), rules and enforcement mechanisms are solely the product
of repeated interactions among the intervening agents. For our
analysis, we have selected the spectrum sharing framework of
the 1695-1710MHz band. We also use the definitions presented
by Bhattarai et al. [9], [10] as well as Altamimi [3] for managing
the size of the coordination and exclusion zones. In addition, we
utilize Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) to analyze the applicability
of these governance mechanisms. ABM simulation allows us to
explore how macro phenomena can emerge from micro-level
interactions of independent agents.
I. INTRODUCTION
Commons is a general term for shared resources in which
each stakeholder has an equal interest over a determined
resource. When natural resources are perceived as commons,
they are typically refered to as Common Pool Resources
(CPR). CPRs are natural or man-made resources shared among
different users that are defined by two main features: i) it
is sufficiently large to make it costly to exclude potential
beneficiaries from its use, and ii) it is characterized by a
high degree of substractability (i.e., a rivalry of consumption)
[37]. We can find many examples of natural goods defined
as “commons” that have been vastly studied in the CPR
literature: fisheries, forests, water systems, pollution, etc. [20].
Nevertheless, a less known example of CPR systems is the
use of the Radioelectric Spectrum for signal transmission
purposes. Spectrum is a resource that benefits a group of users,
benefits diminishes, however, if users independently pursue
their own “self-benefit”.
As pointed out in [22], [23], [50] the exploitation of
spectrum bands can, indeed, be classified as a Common Pool
good. We can start by pointing out the substractability feature
of radio spectrum bands: if a user transmits using a particular
spectrum band, it adds to the noise level for all other users in
the same band. Consequently, based on the Shannon-Hartley
Theorem, an increase in noise1 decreases the available channel
capacity [28]. Inevitably, the band is no longer a suitable
environment for any additional wireless communications in
the same frequency, space and/or time. As to the other CPR
1As explained by Dytso et al. this noise is defined as Gaussian interference
inputs acting as a “foe” of other signals to be transmitted in the same band
[19].
characteristic, the exclusion of users, we assert that it is rela-
tively difficult to exclude an arbitrary user from the use of most
regions of the radioelectric spectrum. Technologies that exploit
spectrum bands made it relatively difficult, complex and costly
to do so. For example, it would be a very complex and costly
task to exclude any given user for transmitting and receiving
signals using, for instance, a Bluetooth or Wi-Fi transceiver.
Consequently, based on Ostrom’s features for a common good
[39], we can see that the exploitation of radioelectric spectrum
bands for transmission purposes perfectly fits the definition of
a CPR.
When thinking about the most common governance mech-
anism for regulating the exploitation of spectrum bands in
the United States, most answers will surely point out to a
“command-and-control” system. This approach refers to the
case where the government2 requires or prohibits specific
actions or technologies, by imposing fines, sanctions and/or
jail terms to rule breakers [18]. This system has been the
“de-facto” approach for spectrum allocation and enforcement
since the Radio Act of 19273. To keep in line with the
adopted command-and-control approach, the main mechanism
for spectrum allocation used by the FCC has been “Licensing”.
These licenses would assign exclusive rights to the assigned
frequency bands under given conditions4 mandated by the
FCC. Nevertheless, in recent times the FCC and NTIA are
working toward a more efficient use and allocation of spectrum
bands. One of the most discussed approaches is spectrum
sharing between Federal and Commercial entities. This “non-
traditional” allocation approach implies a change in the widely
used command-and-control system. Furthermore, a change in
the allocation rules would force an evaluation of the enforce-
ment systems that are foreseen to emerge in this new model
for spectrum management.
A commonly discussed feature regarding Common Pool
Resource systems is, without a doubt, the governance schemes
that have emerged in the regulation and control of this type
of goods. We can observe different approaches for both
governance structures and enforcement systems going from
formal institutions in command and control frameworks to
self-reporting and self-policing. In the case of the latter, no
third party controller or community structures (i.e., third-party
agency) are required. These government-less environment con-
stitutes a distributed enforcement approach. Further, in this
anarchy scheme (i.e., lack of a formal government intervention
as defined by Leeson [30]), rules and enforcement mechanisms
are solely the product of repeated interactions among the
intervening agents in a given environment.
For almost 100 years, command-and-control has been the
de-facto governance mechanism for managing spectrum bands.
2Usually, a federal agency such as the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) or the National Telecommunication and Information Agency
(NTIA).
3The Act determined the creation of a regulatory agency, currently the
Federal Communications Agency (FCC), to administrate spectrum allocation
according to “public convenience, interest or necessity” [44].
4Type of transmitter, the type of technology to be used and other operational
parameters.
Nevertheless, we see government alternatives such as self-
enforcement as valid choices for new Federal-Commercial
sharing schemes. Hence, in our work we explore the two
“extremes” of the governance spectrum. Initially, we explore a
centralized approach (i.e., command-and-control) where gov-
ernmental institutions are in charge of rule definition and
enforcement tasks. Then, we study a distributed approach
with a “government-less” environment with self-enforcement
characteristics.
For our analysis we have selected a well-defined and widely
known Federal-Commercial sharing scheme: the AWS-3’s
1695-1710MHz band. We think this environment constitutes
a good fit for our work due to its simplicity and well-
defined rules. Additionally, as our main tool, we use Agent-
Based Modelling (ABM). This will allow us to analyze the
applicability of the governance mechanisms in greater detail,
since the utilization of an ABM simulation framework allows
us to see how macro phenomena can emerge from micro-level
interactions of independent agents. Thus, defining agents (e.g.,
the primary or secondary users in the sharing interactions),
their behavioral rules (e.g., transmission restrictions) and the
allowed interactions among them, permits us to evaluate the
efficiency of the proposed governance systems at a macro
level.
II. THE SPECTRUM SHARING FRAMEWORK
We focus on the framework of the 1695-1710MHz band
as our base sharing model. This frequency band is part of the
Advanced Wireless Services (AWS-3) defined by the FCC and
the NTIA. We have selected this particular framework for its
simplicity (i.e., there is only one primary user or incumbent)
and the advantages of working with an existing, widely known
and well-defined scheme.
This band was made available to commercial users under the
Spectrum Act’s mandate to identify new commercial spectrum
for auctions by the FCC [43]. The original Incumbents or
Primary Users (PU) are the Meteorological Satellites of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
which are restricted to Space-to-Earth (Downlink) operations
[49]. Mobile LTE handsets (MS) are the Secondary Users (SU)
or new entrants. These users are limited to uplink operations
only in the 1695-1710MHz band. A third participant in the
selected framework is the corresponding eNodeB for each
handset. These final users do not have transmission rights;
however, they are in charge of the coordination functions
between the Federal Incumbents and the Secondary Users.
Initially, the NTIA and the FCC only defined exclusion
zones (EZ)5 around the 27 Primary Users nationwide. In
2014, the Agencies defined a new zone as part of the sharing
rules in the 1695-1710MHz band: Coordination Zones (CZ)
[14]. These new zones extend beyond the border of the EZ.
Their size is based on several factors, including transmit
power, antenna gains in the direction of the interference,
time variations of antenna gains, receiver susceptibility to
5Restricted zones where no new entrants are allowed to transmit.
interference, propagation effects of radio waves, mobility of
earth station, etc. [10]. Moreover, transmission privileges for
SU in this Coordination Zones are granted if, and only if,
the proposed transmission will not interfere with the normal
operations of the PU.
Based on the definitions of Exclusion and Coordination
zones, authors like Bhattarai and Altamimi have developed
approaches to especify the characteristics of these new sharing
environment. In particular, methods for creating and sizing
both resticted zones [3], [9], [10]. These approaches pro-
pose a more flexible scheme that the one suggested by the
FCC/NTIA. The objective is to reduce the size of both types
of zones to increase the value and incentives for potential
new entrants. In this paper, we will be using the notation
introduced by Bhattarai et al. in their definitions of the “The
Multi-Tiered Incumbent Protection Zones (MIPZ)” [10]. This
proposed framework for geolocation-database-driven spectrum
sharing gives the option to the Primary User to adjust the size
of the coordination and exclusion zones “on the fly”. This
adjustments are based on instantaneous interference conditions
and result in the definition of three types of zones around the
primary users (see Fig. 1):
• No Access Zone (NAZ): Defined as the spatial area in
the immediate vicinity of the Primary User (PU). In this
zone, transmission privileges are limited only to licensed
incumbents.
• Limited Access Zone (LAZ): This zone is defined as
the spatial area surrounding the NAZ. In this region, a
limited number of new entrants are allowed to transmit
simultaneously. The limit in the number of simultaneous
transmissions is determined by the Primary User. This
limit is computed using a specific propagation model,
such that transmissions outside the LAZ cause negligible
interference. Hence, the contribution to the aggregate
interference at the PU location can, indeed, be ignored
[9].
• Unlimited Access Zone (UAZ): Is the region that lies
outside the outer boundary of the LAZ. Unlimited trans-
mission privileges are granted to the SU in this area,
since they do not represent any “threat” to the PU’s
transmission in terms of harmful interference.
Fig. 1: MIPZ Theoretical environment layout
III. CENTRALIZED VS. DISTRIBUTED GOVERNANCE
SYSTEMS
As previously presented, Weiss et. al [50] and other authors
in the field have shown that the exploitation of radioelectric
spectrum bands can, indeed, be classified as a Common
Pool Resource (CPR) system. However, as Ostrom explained,
defining governance shcemes for this type of goods is not
an easy task [35]. In fact, to achieve a “smooth” governance
process of the CPRs we need: i) resources and their uses to be
constantly monitored, ii) rates of changes in the resources to be
limited, iii) to maintain close face-to-face communications and
dense social networks, iv) outsiders to be excluded at relatively
low costs and v) users should agree to constant monitoring
and enforcement of the rules [18]. Nevertheless, this is not an
impossible task. Works by Robert Wade, Elinor Ostrom with
Jean-Marie Baland and Jean-Philippe Platteau have recollected
information on successful efforts in manners to manage and
govern this type of resources [1]. The research in the field have
presented several “alternative” arrangements of governance.
For instance, in the analysis of Wade and Ostrom [36], [48]
central governments participate, but cannot undermine the
local authority, while having nested levels of appropriation,
provision, enforcement and governance (i.e., a polycentric
governance approach). On the other hand, Baland and Platteau
[6] found that CPR users and appropiators define the rules
wihtout intervetion of an external agent. Further, external
agencies only assit the community in sanctioning processes.
In our work, we explore the two extremes in the governance
and management of CPRs, namely a centralized approach
(government-centric scheme) and a distributed approach (self-
governing shceme).
A. Centralized Systems
Many political theories frequently assume that individuals
are not capable of reaching credible ex-ante commitments.
This is especially true when there exist substantial ex-post
temptations to break these previous commitments [40]. In light
of these assumptions, Hobbes [24] exposed the need of a
“coercive power, to compel men equally to the performance
of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment, greater
than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant”.
Assuming the weakness of verbal agreements, has led
to many authors in other non-political fields to underscore
the necessity of external agents to enforce contracts and
ex ante agreements. For example, John Nash distinguished
between cooperative and non-cooperative games [32]. In
cooperative games, players can communicate without any
restriction. Moreover, players can make enforceable agree-
ments to improve their mutual payoffs. On the other hand,
in non-cooperative games players can do neither. The main
assumption behind this distinction is that agents are incapable
of reaching enforcement agreements. Even if they reach an
agreement, it will be of no benefit, if the probability that the
intervining parties keep this agreement is low [21]. Therefore,
we need the presence of a “powerful” entity, as argued by
Hobbes in his famous “Leviathan”, to maintain equilibrium
in the system [24].
Hobbes’ ideas, that date back to 1651, have led to the
strong belief that without government there is no law to
prevent the strong from plundering the weak, to stop the
presence and proliferation of “free riders” and the dishonest
taking advantage of the honest. Furthermore, Hobbes critical
assumption was that “without government there cannot be
governance”. Consequently, there would not exist a law to
protect property rights and support social order [30]. As a
result, we all need “the government”, as the central entity, to
determine and enforce the law to maintain social order.
One widely used definition of “government” dates back
to 1919, where Webber defined government as a “territorial
monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion” [29]. This defini-
tion has manny common characteristics with the notion of the
“command-and-control” system. These assumptions have also
been used for developing regulation and enforcement policies
in several fields, including telecommunications. In command-
and-control schemes only governments6 can require or prohibit
specific actions or technologies, with possible fines, sanctions
or jail terms for punishing rule breakers [18]. In other words,
the decision power is concentrated (i.e., centralized) in a single
institution, the government, while other participants have little
or no control. Many authors in the literature agree that when
sufficient resources are made available for monitoring and
enforcement, such approach can be very successful [18],
[30], [37]. Nevertheless, if there is a lack of resources, these
approaches become very inefficient. Not to mention that these
mechanisms have also proved to be economically inefficient
in many circumstances [18].
B. Distributed Systems
Many CPR examples have shown “alternative” governance
systems for an adequate management of goods. Fishers, irriga-
tors, herders, all CPRs’ appropriators, have repeatedly shown
their capacity to organize themselves, create rules, monitor
others and themselves, and successfully enforce the agreed
upon rules. These organizations have been able to create self-
organized and self-controlled institutions without reference to
central authorities (i.e., governmental institutions). Further, the
institutions that have emerged have been sustained over long
periods of time without participation of any external agency
[36].
In the governance literature, a growing body of research
suggests that Hobbes assumption, that a life without govern-
ment is not possible, is wrong. This research path points to a
government-less or self-governance approach. It is important
to mention that these self-governing or private-governing in-
stitutions do not refer to the complete absence of law, instead
they refer to the lack of a formal government or state dictating
and enforcing the law. The main characteristic behind this
idea is that agents, who find themselves in government-less
6It can be interpreted as the government figure in general terms or particular
agencies such as the FCC, which are part of the Federal government.
situations or choose to eschew government, develop their own,
privately-created law [29].
One of the main reasons for having central governmental
institutions is the lack of compromise of the users for keeping
ex-ante agreements. Consequently, the natural question in
this type of private-governing arrangements is: How such
created law is enforced? The short answer to this question
is “Discipline of continuous dealing” [8], [29], [45]. The idea
behind this principle is simple, if you do not behave today, I
will take repressive actions. This actions include stopping the
interaction with you tomorrow, telling others not to interact
with you, reduce your future privileges, etc. Consequently, if
you value the future interaction with a given user and his/her
social network, you will not break the ex-ante agreements.
It is worth mentioning that contrary to the centralized
approach, self-enforcement is not “one model fits all”. Dif-
ferent self-enforcement contexts come with different specific
problems of property protection and conflict resolution. There-
fore, one particular model of private-governing institution will
not necessarily be successful in a different context. Most
importantly, these emerging institutions are fitted to maximize
the “well-being” of the members of the community by contin-
uously adapting their rules, norms and enforcement practises.
IV. THE ABM MODEL
To model the spectrum sharing framework presented in
Section II, we have implemented an agent-based model. An
ABM consists of individual agents (persons, households, firms,
technological equipment, etc.) that are represented as software
“objects” having multiple characteristics. These characteris-
tics can be constants (e.g., gender, political affiliation, etc.),
variable states (e.g., age, world perception, etc.), and rules of
behavior (e.g., utility function, movement, perception func-
tions, etc.). All these independent agents interact with each
other and the environment where they are placed to study the
potential phenomena that can emerge [5]. Our objective is to
show the emergence of global governance setups based only
on the interaction of simple agents following a predifined set
of rules, norms, and individual beliefs and strategies. ABM
allows us to design complex models that are able to capture
the effect of a large number of moving factors, which is one
of the most important characteristics within Common Pool
Resource management systems [20]. Many authors studying
CPRs have already successfully explored this management
problem through the implementation of agent-based models
as we can observe in [17], [20], [26], [27]. In what follows,
we describe the different parts of the system.
A. The Environment
The environment of our model is based on the definitions
presented in Section II. In this way, the “world”7, where the
different agents will be placed, is divided in three zones (see
Fig. 1):
1) No Access Zone (NAZ)
7Defined as the logical or physical plane where the agents are located and
interact with each other [12].
2) Limited Access Zone (LAZ)
3) Unlimited Access Zone (UAZ)
B. The Agents
The spectrum sharing framework of the 1695-1710MHz
band, using both protection and coordination zones, is com-
posed of three participants: meteorological stations, mobile
handsets and base stations. These participants are the agents in
our model as shown in Fig. 2. These agents have the following
characteristics:
• NOAA Meteorological Satellite (MetSat Station):
Static agent using the band for downlink communications.
Its main function, as the Primary User, is to determine
the boundaries (size) of the UAZ, LAZ and NAZ.
• LTE Mobile Stations (LTE Handsets): Defined as the
new entrants or Secondary Users of the system. The
Handsets have the ability to move around the environment
while transmitting to their correspondent Base Stations
(eNodeBs).
• LTE Base Stations (eNodeB): These static agents act
as the connection and coordination points between the
incumbent and the new entrants.
Fig. 2: The agents
C. Agents’ Behavior
This section describes the initial configuration, the rules,
behavior and interactions of the different agents in our model.
1) Initial Configuration: The model is set to have one PU, a
MetSat, and four eNodeBs as coordination points. This number
of static agents is fixed in the model to emulate the definitions
of the band (see Section II). On the other hand, the number of
dynamic secondary users, the handsets, is variable. The total
number of handsets is dictated by the observer8. Each of the
8In ABM, the observer is not an interacting agent. The observer is a “being”
that oversees everything that is going on in the simulation process [46].
created agents is assigned a risk profile9. The assigned profile
dictates the bahavior of the mobile user when moving and
transmitting in the different types of zones.
2) Main Functions: This section describes the main “re-
sponsabilities or duties” assigned to each agent.
• Primary User: The MetSat has a central position in the
simulation environment. The agent defines the initial size
of the zones around it, as well as the maximum number of
simultaneous transmissions that can take place within the
LAZ. In the case of the centralized scheme, these values
are fixed in the simulation setup10. On the other hand, the
boundaries of the Limited Access and No Access zones
are dynamically defined by the MetSat when working
within the decentralized scheme. For this purpose, only
initial zone sizes are defined for the agent11
• Secondary Users: The handsets are not assigned to
a fixed location. Instead, mobile stations are randomly
moving around the environment with no restriction. In
addition, in each time period (time step), each mobile
station determines whether it has data to transmits. If a
transmission is required, the handset proceeds, or not,
based on its own “enforcement perception”12.
• Coordination Points: The agents emulating the eNodeBs
are also assigned to a fixed position around the PU. Every
eNodeB has a variable number of associated hansets
at each time period. These stations are in charge of
evaluating and defining the allowed transmission power
that the handsets can utilize.
3) Interactions: The model is composed of two types of
interactions: Handset-to-eNodeB and MetSat-to-eNodeB.
• The first interaction, Handset-to-eNodeB, allows the bidi-
rectional exchange of information between the coordina-
tion points, the eNodeBs, and the new entrants, the mobile
stations. The information being transmitted includes: size
of the LAZ and NAZ, maximum number of transmissions
in the LAZ, current number of allowed connections in
the LAZ area and association signals between the base
stations and the closest handsets.
• The second interaction, MetSat-to-eNodeB, is established
between the base stations and the PU. The MetSat sends
the size of both, the Limited Access and No Access zones
to the different eNodeBs. In addition, it communicates the
maximum allowed interference threshold in the LAZ and
the number of simultaneous transmissions taking place
in this zone. In turn, each eNodeB coordinates with the
MetSat the handsets’ transmissions within the LAZ.
9A risk profile: “[I]dentifies the acceptable level of risk an individual or
corporation is prepared to accept. A corporations risk profile attempts to
determine how a willingness to take risk (or aversion to risk) will affect an
overall decision-making strategy.” [25].
10Adjusted in the Netlogo model using the ’LAZ’, ’NAZ’ and ’LAZThresh-
old’ controls.
11Adjusted in the Netlogo model using the ’InitialSize’ control.
12See Section IV-D2 for additional details about how each agent measures
its “enforcement perception”.
D. The Rules
A main component in ABM is the definition of rules,
norms and individual strategies. As defined by North in [34]
institutions are usually viewed as “[t]he set of rules actually
used by a set of individuals to organize repetitive activities that
produce outcomes affecting those individuals and potentially
affecting others”. Based on this definition, we can see that the
1695-1710MHz sharing framework can also be categorized as
an “Institution”: the actions of the incumbents have an impact
on the new entrants and vice versa. This new definition of our
sharing scheme is key when defining the rules of the system,
since we can now usthe “ADICO Grammar of Institutions”.
The ADICO model allows us to structure and analyze the
constructed institutions in the simulated systems. Further, it
permits the definition of shared strategies, norms and rules as
institutional statements using five components [15], [20]:
• Attributes: Describe the participants in the situation to
whom the institutional statement applies (i.e., the agents
of the system).
• Deontic: The deontic operators dictate the actions allowed
to the agents. There are three types of operators: obli-
gated, permitted and forbidden.
• aIm: Describes the action or outcomes to which the
institutional statement applies (i.e., the actions related to
the deontic operations for each agent).
• Condition: Are the set of parameters that define when and
where an statement (rule, norm or strategy) applies.
• Sanction (Or else): Is the consequence of non-
compliance to an assigned institutional assignment.
1) ADICO Definitions for the Primary Users: In Table I
we can see the rules that are defined for the Meteorological
Satellites (MetSat). It is important to notice the different
actions for the MetSats. The ones with the white background
apply in all enforcement situations (government-centric and
self-enforcement), while the actions with the blue background
apply only in decentralized enforcement scenarios.
MetSat Definitions
Agent MetSat MetSat MetSat MetSat MetSat
Deontic Obligatted Obligatted Obligatted Permitted Permitted
aIm ComunicateLAZ size
Communicate
NAZ Size
Communicate
LAZ
Threshold
Increase
LAZ &
NAZ size
Decrease
LAZ &
NAZ size
Condition All the time All the time All the time InterferenceHappen
No
Interference
Or Else None None None None None
TABLE I: ADICO rules for the primary user
As previously mentioned, different rules apply according
to the enforcement13 mechanism. Due to this situation, the
strategies for the PU vary in each situation, as explained in
what follows.
Centralized Enforcement: In the case of the command-
and-control scheme, the MetSat has little control over the
parameters that impact its behavior. For instance, the size of
the Limited and No Access zones are given by the regulator
13In the case of CPRs, the literature situates enforcement as part of the
governance structure and incorporates it into the definition of rules [38].
as a fixed size, and cannot be updated by the MetSat. In
the same way, the amount of simultaneous transmissions is a
fixed parameter in the model. Consequently, the MetSat’s only
strategy in this scenario is to communicate these parameters
to the coordination points. With regards to the detection rate
d in our scheme14, it is given by the effectiveness of detection
imposed by the government enforcer15. Further, these are fixed
during the complete simulation process.
Decentralized Enforcement: The PU has greater control
over the sharing parameters in the self-enforcement scenario.
In this case, the MetSat can update the parameters based
on the past interference-events as shown in Table I. For this
purpose, the MetSat can reduce the size of the LAZ and NAZ
areas if it receives a good “signal” from the SU (i.e., if no
interference has occurred). Otherwise, it can increase the size
of both LAZ and NAZ if an interference event has occurred.
However, since the detection part is also done as a self-task,
the variation in the size of these zones has a direct impact
on the ability to detect interference events (i.e, the detection
rate d decreases due to the increase on the monitoring area).
For our model, we have selected a simple linear relationship
to capture the aforementioned problem, as described in the
following expression:
d =
MxE
S
(1)
In Equation 1, d refers to the detection rate of interference
events in both the LAZ and NAZ. This rate is the product
of M , which represents the minimum size of the zone to
avoid interference events, and E16, which is the effectiveness
of detection of the equipment being used and divided by S,
which indicates the size of the restricted areas around the PU.
One final consideration in the scheme, is the initial size of
the LAZ and NAZ. As presented in Section III-B, the decision
of the initial size of the areas around the primary user can vary
according to past signals from other users [29]. This is also
captured in the model, where different sizes (From 10% to
100%) can be utilized for both the Limited and No Access
Zones.
In Fig. 3, we can see how the size of the zones, going
from minimum to maximum allowed area, and the detection
effectiveness of the “enforcer”17 change the detection ability
of the system. Therefore, we can see that, as the size of the
area increases, the detection rate decreases. In the same way,
we can observe that different system effectiveness values18
produce different curves for the final detection rate in the
LAZ and NAZ. In this manner, the strategy for the PU, the
Meteorological Satellite, to increase or reduce the size of the
areas, S, can be defined using the following expression:
14See Section IV-D2 for additional details about the detection rate in the
model.
15Adjusted in the ABM model using the ’DetectionRateNAZ’ and ’Detec-
tionRateLAZ’ controls.
16Adjusted in the ABM model using the ’DetectionEffectivity’ control.
17In the case of self-enforcement, there is not a central entity as an
enforcement unit [29]. Instead, there exists a detection system in place.
18Adjusted in the ABM model using the ‘DetectionEffectivity’ control.
S =
{
Increase, Interference ≥ 1 and S < 1
Decrease, Interference = 0 and S > 0
(2)
Fig. 3: Impact of the decision parameters in the detection rate
2) ADICO Definitions for the Secondary Users: In Table
II we can observe the rules defined for the secondary users or
mobile stations. One important thing to notice here is that the
defined rules do not vary with the type of enforcement system
in place. The reason behind this assumption is that the SU
always follow the same rule: only transmit when authorized.
Handset Definitions
Attributes Handset Handset Handset Handset Handset
Deontic Obligated Forbidden Permitted Permitted Permitted
aIm Associate witheNodeB
Transmit in
NAZ
Transmit in
LAZ
Transmit in
UAZ
Move
around
Condition All the time All the time TXs <Threshold All the time All the time
Or Else None Sanction Sanction None None
TABLE II: ADICO rules for the secondary users
The behavioral strategy for the SUs is taken from the tax
evasion literature. In particular, the works by Bloomquist [11],
Mittone and Patelli [31], and Davids et al. [16]. While all
agents have a set rules to follow, they might break them from
time to time. In other words, they might choose to transmit
in the NAZ or the LAZ (when the maximum threshold has
already been reached), which will cause an interference event.
To account for this decision making process, our model is
based on the standard microeconomic theory of Allinghman
and Sandmo [2]. This economical theorem says that a given
user will break the rules whenever the perceived “caught”19
rate, p, and penalty rate, f , where f ≥ 0, take on values that
make expression 3 true.
19Defined as committing an infraction and being sanctioned for it.
p <
1
1 + f
(3)
The problem with Equation 3 is that it does not capture
many other factors that are involved in the decision making
pocess of a given agent. In this light, Bloomquist [11] argues
that rule breakers with high compliance opportunity costs (i.e,
high discount rates) are more likely to break the rules than
other agents. Nonetheless, this is not the only additional factor
that influence the decisions of a given agent. For instance,
the time lag between breaking-the-rule and the sanction or
the detection ability of the system should also be taken into
account. Based on these assumptions, we have an alternative
decision making expression, which is shown in equation 4.
p <
1
1 + cr
(4)
cr =
fxd
(1 + ri)t
(5)
With our new parameters a given user will break the rules
if, and only if, expression 4 is true. Where the expression cr
is the product of the interaction of the most important factors
affecting the decisions of a given agent. First, t, is the number
of time periods between the infraction and the detection, d, is
the detection rate of the enforcer, where 0 ≤ d ≤ 1 and ri is
the discount rate for the agent i. This implies that the present
value of breaking the rules is inversely related as an exponent
to the length of time between an infraction and its detection
(see Eq. 5) [11].
Based on expressions 4 and 5, a given user will break the
rules whenever the perceived “caught” rate, p, and the agent
perception, cr, take on values that make expression 6 true.
Tx =
No, if p ≥
1
1 + cr
Y es, Otherwise
(6)
Multiple levels for the factors described at 6 are possible.
Further, different combinations of these factors can result in
distinct situations for the agents as depicted in Fig. 4. Thus,
for example, if the detection is immediate, the decision of
transmitting depends only in the detection rate, d. Moreover,
when only one time period passes between the infraction and
the sanction, the transmission decision is based only in the
discount rate, ri, of each agent. Finally, we observe the effect
of all the features of the decision making process having
different outcomes based on the discount rate, the detection
time and the detection rate of the system. Showing, in this
way, that the Bloomquist expression captures all the factors
involved in the particular decisions of an independent agent.
In our agent-based model, all the aforementioned parameters
are included. Thus, as we can see in Table III, the model uses
different values for the detection rate in both the LAZ and
NAZ, the average discount rate for the agents and time delay
between the infraction and the sanction.
Fig. 4: Effects of the different parameters in the decision making process of a given agent
Our model is based in the perception of the users about
the probability of being “caught”. As shown in Table III, four
types of available functions determine the perception of the
agents in our system:
1) Actual: The agents know the exact detection rate, d. All
agents have the same perception with no distinctions.
2) Actual + Random: The agents know the exact detection
rate, d. Nevertheless, they have different perceptions
based on their risk profiles and the known rate.
3) Perceived: The agents do not know the exact detection
rate, d. A random perceived rate is assigned to each
agent. These rates are based on their risk profiles. It is
important to notice that this agent perception is updated
based on its own and its neighbors20 experiences.
4) Perceived + Random: The agents do not know the exact
detection rate, d. A random perceived rate is assigned
to each agent. These rates vary according to their risk
profiles. This perception is not a fixed value. In fact,
it is dynamically updated based on the agent’s and its
neighbor’s experiences.
ABM Variable Name Levels
PerceptionFunction Agent Perception: p Actual, Perceived,Actual+Random, Perceived+Random
DetectionRateNAZ Detection Rate in NAZ: d From 0 to 100%
DetectionRateLAZ Detection Rate in LAZ: d From 0 to 100%
AverageDiscountRate Discount Rate: ri From 0 to 100%
AdjudicationTime Time to be sanctioned: t From 0 to 10 Time Periods
PenaltyRate Penalty: f From 0 to 10 Units
TABLE III: Factors included in the ABM model
Andreoni et al. [4], among other authors in the economic
field, have exposed that the level of compliance in enforce-
ment situations is actually higher that the predicted by the
expected utility (EU) theory. One of the explanations for this
phenomenon is the tendency of the users to overweight low
probability events [11], [33]. In order to obtain more accurate
20Neighbor influence only present when the ‘Social Network’ characteristic
is activated.
perception rates, Bernasconi [7] shows that the rates can be
transformed using an empirically-derived weighting function
based on rank dependent expected utility (RDEU) as denoted
in the following expression:
p′ =
(1− p)g
[(pxg) + (1− p)g]1/g (7)
This new perception rate, p′, captures the higher compliance
problem in enforcement situations. This ”weighted” rate is
the product of the original perception rate, p, and a shape
parameter, g. We did incorporate this economic notion in our
model, using a shape parameter g = 0.6321. This shape param-
eter is the result of averaging three independently estimated
values: Tversky and Kahneman (0.61) [47], Camerer and Ho
(0.56) [13] and Wu and Gonzalez (0.71) [51]. This perception
also evolves as the features of the enforcement change. For
instance, if the detection rate is increased/decreased, the agents
adjust their perceived rates. In the same manner, if an agent
or one of its neighbors was “caught” the perceived rates are
modified for future transmissions.
Finally, the ABM model includes a “social network”22
characteristic. This feature refers to the “status” of a given
agent’s “neighbors”. In other words, if any of the neighbors
was sanctioned, this has an impact in the agent’s perception
for future interactions. Consequently, it modifies the behavior
and strategy of the agent. This characteristic was included
to capture the effect of “social preasure” in the decision
making process of the agents. This allows us to simulate
what happens when communication and information exchange
between agents is added to the governance procedures [37].
E. Implementation
Our ABM model was implemented in the Netlogo platform.
The selected tool allows for multi-agent programming and
21Adjusted in the ABM model using the ‘PerceptionWeight?’ control.
22Adjusted in the ABM model using the ‘SocialNetwork?’ control.
Fig. 5: Screenshot of the user interface of the model implemented in netlogo
modelling environment for simulating natural and social phe-
nomena. One of the main characteristics of NetLogo is that
it is particularly well suited for modelling complex systems
evolving over time. The tool also facilitates the exploration of
connections between micro-level behaviors of individuals and
macro-level patterns that emerge from their interactions [46].
The resulting model is the product of the agents and their
corresponding rules, norms, strategies and interactions as it is
shown in Fig. 5 and described in Section IV.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
A. The Experiments
To capture all the possible combinations of the factors of the
model we use a “Full Factorial Experimental Design”: All
combination of levels, assuming k factors, every ith factor
with n levels and r repetitions for each level being tested,
as shown in expression 8. For our setup we have chosen a
total of 10 replications23 for each experiment to guarantee
that the variance in the model is captured. As described in
previous sections, both enforcement mechanisms are based in
different assumptions. Nevertheless, there are some features in
our model that are common to both governance systems, as
depicted in Table IV.
23The total number of experiments, TNE, using the independent variables
(i.e., factors and their levels) shown in Tables IV, V and VI is 11,520.
TNE = r[
k∏
i=1
(ni)] (8)
Independent Variables
Factors Levels
“Risk Averse” Handsets 100
“Risk Neutral” Handsets 100
“Risk Prone” Handsets 100
Average Discount Rate 10, 20 and 50
Adjudication Time 0, 1, 5 and 10
Penalty Rate 0, 10
Social Network ON and OFF
Perception Function Actual, Perceivedand Perceived+Random
LAZ Threshold 1, 5 and 10
TABLE IV: Experiment design: Common factors
In the case of the government-centric system (i.e., the
centralized framework), the agents have little or no control
over the different parameters in the model. In this manner, a
centralized organization is in charge of specifying the variables
for the simulation process. Furthermore, the ability to detect
an event (i.e., detection rate in the LAZ and NAZ areas) is a
fixed value determined by the same entity with no intervention
of the other agents. All these factors and their corresponding
levels are detailed in Table V.
For the self-enforcement system (the decentralized frame-
work), the different factors of the system are coordinated
Fig. 6: Government-centric: Impact of the different factors in the number of transmissions and events in the system
Independent Variables
Factors Levels
Detection Rate NAZ 25 50 75 100
Detection Rate LAZ 25 50 75 100
NAZ Size 25 50 75 100
LAZ Size 25 50 75 100
TABLE V: Experiment design: Government-centric factors
between the agents simulating the Primary and Secondary
users. Nevertheless, as an initial setup of the system, the model
requires the input of two key factors: Initial Zones Size (LAZ
and NAZ) and Detection Effectiveness (see Table VI).
Independent Variables
Factors Levels
Initial Size LAZ 20 40 60 80
Initia Size NAZ 20 40 60 80
Detection Efectiveness 25 50 75 100
TABLE VI: Experiment design: Self-enforcement factors
B. The Results
1) Government-centric system (Centralized framework):
We will start the discussion of our results by talking about the
main findings regarding the government-centric scheme. The
first thing we would like to discuss about in this environment
is the number of transmissions and number of events in
the system. These variables are the product of varying the
principal components in the enforcement framework. We can
observe in Fig. 6 the impact of factors such as the influence of
the peers (i.e., social network), the average discount rate of the
SU, the penalty rate and the adjudication time over the total
number of transmissions and the corresponding interference
events in the system.
The presence of a social network (neighbor influence)
reduces the number of interference events without a reduction
in the total number of transmissions. In the same manner, if the
users have a lower “valuation” of the future (i.e., less discount
rate, ri) the number of interference events is considerably
reduced. This phenomenon is also true for the penalty rate
and adjudication time. Thus, we have that with higher penalty
rates the number of events is visibly reduced. Comparativly,
when the time between the infraction is committed and the
sanction is adjudicated is reduced from 10 to 0 time periods,
the total number of events is also reduced. Even though all
the parameters described in Fig. 6 have a direct impact in the
number of transmissions and also the number of enforceable
events, factors such as the average discount rate, the penalty
rate and the adjudication delay present a more noticeable
ifluence in the total number of interference events.
One of the main components in the decision making process
of our model is the perception of the Secondary Users (see
Section IV-D2). As shown in Fig. 8, the SUs’ perception
influences the number of interference events in our system.
If the users know the rate of detection (i.e., actual perception
Fig. 7: Government-centric: Number of events and system factors
function), more infractions are committed. On the other hand,
when the agents have only a perception of the detection rate,
the number of events is considerably reduced. Nonetheless,
when the detection rate is considerably high there are still
some users transmitting when only a perception of reality is
given, which does not happen when users known the exact
rate.
Fig. 8: Government-centric: Effects of the SU perception
function
Fig. 7 shows how the number of enforceable events is
correlated to the detection ability of the system and the
different factors for the agents. For instance, as the penalty
rate is increased, from minimum to maximum, there exists a
considerable reduction in the number of enforceable events.
This is also true for all other factors in the environment.
Thus, if an agent has a high discount rate and knows that
the adjudication time is the highest possible, it will generate
more interference events. Finally, the presence of a social
network has a very visible impact. In this case, we can see that
when neighbors have been caught and the agent discovers this
situation, the number of events is clearly reduced compared
to scenarios where there is no peer influence.
One of the main characteristics in the government-centric
framework is that the detection rate of enforceable events
is given by an external agent, the central entity. Further,
this value is fixed during the whole simulation process to
emulate governmental processes of evaluating and monitoring
the environment. As it can be observed in Fig. 9 this has the
expected impact: as the detection rate increases the number of
events is reduced in both zones, LAZ and NAZ. In fact, we can
observe a stable behavior with regards to the detection rates in
the system. Nevertheless, even with high detection rates (e.g.,
75%), we still have several events occurring in the system.
Fig. 9: Government-centric: Detection rate and events
The final part of the analysis regarding the centralized
enforcement approach covers how the combination of envi-
ronment factos can influence different system behaviors. In
Fig. 10, we can observe the worst, middle and best case
scenarios for the government-centric enforcement system. The
best case scenario implies that the enforcement parameters
are at their “best”. In other words, the adjudication time is
0 (no delay between infraction and sanction), the penalty
rate is the maximum possible and the discount rate for the
users is 0. The worst case scenario, on the other hand, is
the complete opposite: time delay is 10, highest discount rate
and lowest penalty possible. Lastly, the middle case captures
an intermediate point between the two previously described
scenarios. As we can observe, only in the optimal situation,
best case scenario, we have a very low number of events.
Otherwise, even in the “middle scenario”, we have almost as
high interference events as in our worst case scenario.
Fig. 10: Government-centric: Enforcement scenarios
2) Self-enforcement system (Distributed framework): In
what follows, we will explore the main findings regarding the
self-governing framework. As descibed in Section IV-D2 the
size of the restricted zones LAZ and NAZ stems from the
interactions between the incumbent and the new entrant. In
the same manner, the ability to detect an interference event
is based on the area to monitor and the effectiveness of the
method used to detect potential events. In this manner, in Fig.
11, we can talk, first, about the increase in the number of
events as the size of the NAZ increases. On the other hand,
we can see that the resulting detection rate in the zone has a
negative impact in the number of interference events. Finally,
in the same manner as centralized mechanisms, the perception
function influences the number of events. Hence, when agents
know the detection rate, there is a higher number of events.
Nonetheless, we can see that the kwonledge of the actual
detection rate avoids certain unauthorized transmissions, which
do occur under the uncertanty of only perceiving the rate.
In the Limited Access Zone, we have the same phenomena
as we saw before (see Fig. 12). The size of the area increases as
interference events and the corresponding negotiotions occur.
This increase, nonetheless, is translated into an increment of
Fig. 11: Self-enforcement: Events in the NAZ
Fig. 12: Self-enforcement: Events in the LAZ
events in this area. With regards to the perception function
of the SU agents, we can observe the same trend: when the
detection rate is known, the number of interference events goes
up. However, as shown before, the perception of the rate lead
up to interference events in situations where full knowledge
does not.
While negotiations of the different enforcement parameters
take place dynamically between the agents during the execu-
tion of the model, two initial parameters are still necessary: the
initial size of the LAZ and NAZ and the detection effectiveness
of the enforcement system. In Fig. 13 we explore the influence
of these initial parameters. The initial size has the greater
effect in the number of events. When considering the smallest
size, the biggest signaling gesture, we can see that almost
25% of the time there were no interference events in the
restricted zones. On the other hand, for bigger initial areas
we see a higher number of interference events. This is more
evident when the initial size is a its maximum possible size,
the detection rate causes an immediate peak in the number of
events from the first time period.
Fig. 13: Self-enforcement: Effects of the ‘Initial Size’
The other initial parameter in our self-enforcement scheme
is the detection effectiveness of the system. In Fig. 14 we can
observe how the“effectiveness”24 shapes the environment. As
depicted, the effectiveness alone does have an impact in the
number of events. Nonetheless, it is not as clear as the initial
signaling (i.e., initial size). In this case, all the scenarios have
at least some interference events. However, as expected, the
number of events is inversely proportional to the effectiveness:
as it increases we see fewer interference events happening.
From the interaction between the initial parameters in the
model and the behavior of the system, it is worth mentioning
the fact that signaling is a more important characteristic
in the self-governing framework. When comparing Figs. 13
and 14 we can clearly observe that the initial size has a
bigger influence in the number of enforceable events than the
24It is important to mention that this value refers to the actual equipment
effectiveness or the ability of the utilized method to detect potential interfer-
ences. It does not refer to the detection rate in the restricted zones, which is
the product of the effectiveness and the size of the LAZ and NAZ areas (see
Section IV-D2).
Fig. 14: Self-enforcement: Effects of the ‘Detection Effective-
ness’
detection effectiveness. This beahavior agrees with other self-
governing signaling25 examples in the literature [29].
To guarantee the “discipline of continuous dealing”, the
agents negotiate a key characteristics in the framework: the
size of the restricted areas, LAZ and NAZ (see Fig 15).
The first thing to notice is that the proposed negotiation of
increasing and reducing the restricted areas takes place in
almost all scenarios. When talking about the initial signal
between the PU and SUs (i.e., the initial size), we can see
that all values converge to a stable state in which they agree
to a proper area size. In addition, we can notice that when
the sizes are over 50% of the maximum allowed, they are
reduced to more manageable sizes. On the other hand, if the
initial signaling is of a “higher trust” level (i.e., starting with
smaller sizes), there is an increase in the area.
When analyzing the detection effectiveness of the system, it
is also shown that it has an impact in the negotiation process.
This is due to the fact that when a higher number of agents are
“caught” or their neighbors were sanctioned, their perception
about the enforcement mechanisms changes. Consequently, the
number of interference events is reduced and the negotiations
take place to increase or reduce the size of the restricted areas.
In the particular case of effectiveness, we can see that when
it is very low, we can expect only an increase in the LAZ and
NAZ. However, for values over 50% of detection we can see a
reduction in the areas, which is even more evident in very high
effectiveness rates. Finally, it is important to point out that in
25The PU signals to the SU trust by choosing different area sizes for the
NAZ and LAZ. A smaller area sends a message of trust in the SU and vice
versa.
the same way as the initial size, the cases with effectiveness
alone take a little more time, but they do reach a stable state.
Fig. 15: Self-enforcement: Effects of the model factors in the
NAZ and LAZ size
In Fig. 16 the x-axis depicts the initial signaling (i.e., initial
size) and the y-axis shows the detection effectiveness of the
system. The first thing to notice is the combination of a very
high detection rate and the smallest initial size produces the
best result in the system (i.e., the lowest number of enforceable
events). Further, for all cases with a smaller area we observe
the lowest number of events in the system. For higher values of
the area size we observe an interesting phenomenon: although
the detection effectiveness increases, the number of events is
not reduced in the same proportion. This shows, again, that
in the self-enforcement scenario the signaling between users
has a greater impact than the effectiveness of “catching bad
agents”.
In Fig. 17 we can observe the relationship between factors
such as Social Network, Average Discount Rate, Penalty Rate
and Adjudication Time with the number of transmissions
and events in the framework. In the same manner as the
centralized approach, we observe a direct influence in the
number of events for each of the aforementioned parameters.
In that way, we see the biggest effect for the penalty rate
and the adjudication time. When the penalty rate goes from
minimum, 1, to maximum, 10, the distribution in the time
periods with zero events is evidently higher. This is also true
for the adjudication time, when the time between the infraction
and the sanction is higher, there is a more uniform distribution
with less “zero-events” cases. Although the social network and
average discount rate seem to have a less evident impact, we
can still see how these parameters influence the number of
“interferences”.
Fig. 16: Self-enforcement: Initial Size vs. Detection Rate
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We first want to highlight the construction of the ABM
for spectrum sharing scenarios. It is true that Agent-Based
Modelling has been vastly used in other CPR examples includ-
ing fisheries, forests, water systems, etc. Nevertheless, little
work has been done to explore spectrum sharing scenarios
using both ABM and its CPR spectrum definition. Therefore,
we showed the feasibility of constructing such a model and,
moreover, the exploration of findings, while simulating gover-
nance/enforcement systems applied to our sharing framework.
This work has a different approach than other papers
analyzing enforcement mechanisms. We used microeconomic
concepts from tax evasion based on the perception of the users
rather than, for example, utility functions. This approach has
shown to be quite beneficial, since it captures characteristics
such as future value of transmissions and the time delay
between infraction and sanction introduced by the “enforcer”.
In addition, we were able to capture the effect of agents
havimg full knowledge of the enforcement system in place.
This was achieved by applying multiple “user perception
functions” in our framework. This alternative between full-
knowledge and user perception showed a strong influence in
the number of enforceable events in both, centralized and
distributed schemes.
In the government-centric (centralized) framework, we first
need to point out that all the enforcement parameters influence
the number of transmissions and number of events in the
system. For instance, we observe that the presence of a
social network considerably reduces the number of enforce-
able events. Comparativly, if the enforcement agency is agile
enough to reduce the time lag between infraction and sanction,
the number of events is also significantly reduced.
Our results showed that only when all the parameters are
at their best (i.e., best-case scenario): low adjudication time,
social network influence, high penalties, etc. we have an
efficient system with a low number of enforceable events.
Nevertheless, if the factors are not only at their worst, but
Fig. 17: Self-enforcement: Impact of the different variables in the number of transmissions and events in the system
also in an intermediate point the system has a high number of
”interference” events.
As we specified in Section III-A, in the centralized scheme
the governmental agency is in charge of defining and enforcing
the rules. Consequently, an external agent is responsible for
determining not only the size of the restricted areas, but also
the detection effectiveness within them. In this situation, we
found that to guarantee a successful result, the system needs
to achieve a high detection rate in both the NAZ and LAZ.
With low “catching” rates of 50% and 25% the number of
events is almost double of those occurring with high 75%,
or more, detection rates. These results show the amount of
resources needed by the central agency to monitor and control
the created restricted areas.
In the case of the self-governing or distributed approach the
most important aspect to point out is the successful interaction
between the primary and secondary users. As we observed,
the size of the areas and consequently the ability to detect
“bad guys” within them stems from the negotiation process
between the agents. Further, we can see that irrespective of
the initial parameters, most of the time the system reaches a
“stable state”.
Regarding the initial signalling (setting up the initial LAZ
and NAZ sizes and the detection effectiveness of the system)
we can see that the trust signal of reducing the size from
the starting point has the biggest impact in the environment.
Indeed, when starting with the smallest size, we can expect
little or no interference events in the system. This is consistent
with the “Discipline of continuous dealing” principle: A good
gesture by the PU is retributed by the SU and vice versa
(see Section III-B) and other examples of signaling in self-
governing systems.
The perception characteristics also had a great impact in
the case of the self-governing framework. In this work, we
showed four different perception functions for SUs. From our
results, we can see that if the users know the rate of detection,
more ”infractions” are committed. On the other hand, when the
agents only have a perception of this rate, the number of events
is considerably reduced. Nonetheless, the solely perception
of a rate leads to interference events happening where full
knowledge scenarios do not.
VII. FUTURE WORK
For future additions to this work, we would like to explore
additional rules of association and negotiation in the self-
enforcement approach. For instance, we are interested in
exploring other type of negotiations such as maximum number
of LAZ simultaneous transmissions, assignment of property
rights, etc. Moreover, we aim to study additional strategies
and rules in the agent’s behavioral space that may influence
the stability of the system.
In this work we explored the two “extremes” of gover-
nance/enforcement systems. In future works, we are interested
in exploring additional options for governance frameworks.
In particular, we are curious about collaborative systems
appearing in the literature of CPRs. One example of this
type of enforcement is the “polycentric” approach studied
by Ostrom [38]. Moreover, we are interested in community
enforcement systems, where the task of “catching bad agents”
is a collaborative effort of multiple agents in the same level
of hierarchy.
In our model, the decision making process is based on the
perception of the users. However, there are other approaches
that we can explore. For instance, the utility functions and
processes presented by Polinsky et al. in [42] or the consider-
ations about enforcement characteristics introduced by Polinsy
and Shavell in their work “Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis” [41].
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